

DR. DAYANAND BHARGAVA

JAINA

TARKA

BHĀṢĀ

JAINA TARKA BHĀṢĀ

2004
D.AI-B

MOTILAL
BANSIDASS

©MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Indological Publishers and Booksellers

Head Office : BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHARNAGAR, DELHI-7

Branches : 1. CHOWK, VARANASI (U.P)

2. ASHOK RAJ PATH (OPP. PATNA COLLEGE),
PATNA-4 (BIHAR)

7

2911.112

291-B

First Edition : Delhi 1973

Price **NEW**

₹100.00

29196

Printed in India

BY SHANTILAL JAIN, AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, BUNGALOW ROAD,
JAWAHARNAGAR, DELHI-7, AND PUBLISHED BY SUNDARLAL JAIN, FOR
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHARNAGAR, DELHI-7.

CONTENTS

1. CONTENTS	III—IX
2. INTRODUCTION	X—XVII
3. TEXT	१—३०
१. प्रमाणपरिच्छेदः	पृ. १-२१ ।
(The numericals indicate the para)	
मंगलाचरणम्;	
प्रमाणसामान्यस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम्—१, लब्धीन्द्रियमेव प्रमाणमिति मतस्य खण्डनम्—२;	
प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्—३; प्रत्यक्षस्य सांख्यव्यवहारिक-पारमार्थिकत्वाभ्यां द्विधा विभजनम्—४;	
सांख्यव्यवहारिकस्येन्द्रियजानिन्द्रियजभेदाभ्यां द्विधा द्वयोश्चानयोः पुनर्मति-श्रुतभेदानां द्विधा विभजनम् मतिश्रुतयोर्विवेकश्च—५;	
मतिज्ञानस्य चतुर्विधत्वम्—६; व्यञ्जनावग्रहस्य नयन-मनोवर्जेन्द्रिय-भेदाच्चातुर्विध्यप्रदर्शनप्रसङ्गे मनसश्चक्षुषोश्च प्राप्यकारित्वसिद्धान्तखण्डनम्-७;	
अर्थावग्रहस्य निरूपणम्—८;	
बालस्य सामान्यग्रहणं परिचितविषयस्य विशेषज्ञानमित्यपेक्षया, तेन शब्द इत्यवग्रहीत इति नानुपन्नमिति मतस्य खण्डनम्—९; आलोचनापूर्वकेऽर्थावग्रहे सत्यालोचनं सामान्यग्राहि तथा र्थावग्रह इतरव्यावृत्तवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहीति न सूत्रानुपपत्तिरिति मतस्य खण्डनम्—१०; नैश्चयिकव्यावहारिकत्वाभ्यां द्विविधेऽवग्रहे क्षिप्रैतरादिभेदसङ्गतिः—११;	
ईहानिरूपणम्—१२; अवायः—१३; धारणा तस्यास्त्रैविध्यञ्च—१४;	
व्युत्पत्त्यर्थमनुसृत्यासद्भूतार्थविशेषव्यतिरेकावधारणमपायः, सद्भूतार्थविशेषावधारणञ्च धारणेति मतखण्डनम्—१५;	
गृहीतग्राहित्वादविच्युतिस्मृतिलक्षणी ज्ञानभेदी न प्रमाणमिति मतस्य धारणा क्वापि न घटत इति मतस्य च खण्डनम्—१६;	
अवग्रहादीनामुत्क्रमव्यतिक्रमाभ्यां न्यूनत्वेन वानुत्पादनं षट्त्रिंशदधिकानि त्रीणि शतानि मतेर्भेदाश्च—१७;	

ध्रुवज्ञानस्य चतुर्दशभेदाः १८;

पारमार्थिक-प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणं त्रैविध्यमवघर्लक्षणं षट्भेदत्वञ्च—१९;

मनःपर्यवज्ञानस्य लक्षणं द्वैविध्यञ्च—२०;

केवलज्ञाननिरूपणम्—२१; केवलज्ञानस्य योगजघर्मानुगृहीतमनोजन्यत्व-
मात्रखण्डनम्—२२; केवलभोजिनः कैवल्यं नेति दिगम्बरमतखण्डनम्—२३;

परोक्षस्य लक्षणं पञ्चप्रकारकत्वं स्मृतेरप्रामाण्यखण्डनञ्च—२४;

प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य निरूपणम्—२५; नैकं प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्वरूपमिति बौद्धमत-
खण्डनम्—२६; पूर्वदर्शनाहितसंस्कारप्रबोधोत्पन्नस्मृति-सहायमिन्द्रियं प्रत्यभि-
ज्ञानमुत्पादयतीति मतखण्डनम्—२७;

सादृश्यज्ञानं तूपमानं न प्रत्यभिज्ञानमिति मीमांसकानां मतस्य खण्डनम्
—२८;

सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूपमुपमानमिति नैयायिकानां मतस्य खण्डनम्
—२९;

तर्कस्य लक्षणनिरूपणम्—३०; भ्रूयोदर्शनव्यभिचारादर्शनसहकृतेनेन्द्रियेण
व्याप्तिग्रहोऽस्त्विति मतं खण्डयित्वा तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यस्थापना—३१; प्रत्यक्ष-
पृष्ठभावि विकल्परूपत्वान्न तर्कः प्रमाणमिति बौद्धमतस्य खण्डनम्—३२;
व्याप्यस्याहार्यारोपेण व्यापकस्याहार्यप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः, न चायं स्वतःप्रमाण-
मिति नैयायिकमतस्य खण्डनम्—३३;

अनुमानस्य लक्षणं द्विधा विभजनञ्च—३४; हेतुर्लक्षणप्रसङ्गे त्रिलक्षणा
एव हेतुरिति बौद्धानां मतस्य खण्डनम्—३५; पक्षधर्मताऽनुमितौ नाङ्गमिति
प्रतिपादनम्—३६; सार्वत्रिक्याः व्याप्तेर्विषयभेदमात्रेणान्तर्व्याप्तिबहिर्व्याप्तित्वा-
भ्यां भेदस्य दुर्वचत्वम् पाञ्चरूप्यं हेतुलक्षणमिति नैयायिकमतस्य च खण्डनम्
—३७;

साध्यलक्षणनिरूपणम्—३८; कथायां शङ्कितस्यैव साध्यस्य साधनं युक्तमिति
मतस्य खण्डनम्—३९; साध्यलक्षणेऽनिराकृतमिति वादिप्रतिवाद्युभयापेक्षया-
भीप्सितमिति च वाद्यपेक्षयैवोक्तम्—४०; व्याप्तिग्रहणसमयापेक्षया धर्म एव
साध्यमानुमानिकप्रतिपत्त्यवसरापेक्षया च तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मः साध्यम्—४१;
धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिः प्रमाणात् विकल्पात् प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याञ्चेति—४२; विकल्प-
सिद्धेर्धर्मिणि न सत्ता साध्येति बौद्धमतस्य खण्डनम्—४३; विकल्पसिद्धो धर्मो
नास्त्येवेति नैयायिकमतस्य खण्डनम्—४४; विकल्पसिद्धस्य धर्मिणो नाखण्डस्यैव
भानम्—४५; खण्डशः प्रसिद्धपदार्थास्तित्वनास्तित्वसाधनौचित्यम्—४६;
परार्थानुमानस्य लक्षणनिरूपणप्रसङ्गे पक्षस्याप्रयोग इति सौगतस्य मतस्य
खण्डनम्—४८; हेतोः साध्योपपत्त्यनुपपत्तिभ्यां द्विधा प्रयोगः—४९; पक्षहेतु-

वचनलक्षणमवयवद्वयमेव परप्रतिपत्त्यङ्गम्—५०; मन्दमतींस्तु प्रति दृष्टान्तो-
पनयनिगमनप्रयोगः पक्षशुद्ध्यादिप्रयोगश्चेति दशावयवो हेतुः—५१;

हेतोर्विधिधाः भेदाः विधिरूपो विधिसाधको हेतुः षोढा—५२; विधिरूपो
निषेधसाधको हेतुः सप्तधा—५३; प्रतिषेधरूपो विधिसाधकः पञ्चधा—५४;
प्रतिषेधरूपः प्रतिषेधसाधकः सप्तधा—५५;

त्रिधा हेत्वाभासः—५६; अन्यतरासिद्धस्य हेत्वाभासस्य सिद्धिः—५७;
विरुद्धलक्षणम्—५८, अनैकान्तिकलक्षणम्—५९; धर्मभूषणप्रतिपादिताकिञ्चि-
त्काराख्यहेत्वाभासस्य खण्डनम्—६०;

आगमप्रमाणलक्षणनिरूपणम्—६१; आगमे सप्तभङ्गी—६२;

सप्तभङ्गानां स्वरूपम्—६३; सप्तभङ्गानां सकलादेशस्वभावत्वं विकला-
देशस्वभावत्वञ्च—६४; कालाद्यष्टानामभेदभेदयोर्विनियोगः—६५;

२. नयपरिच्छेदः

पृ० २१—२५;

नयस्वरूपनिरूपणं नयानां द्रव्याधिकपर्यायाधिकत्वाभ्यां द्विधा विभजनमन-
योश्च भेदेषु ऋजुसूत्रस्य जिनभद्रगणिते द्रव्याधिकेऽन्तर्भावः—१; नैगमनयनि-
रूपणम्—२; सङ्ग्रहनयनिरूपणम्—३; ऋजुसूत्रनयनिरूपणम्—४; शब्दनय-
निरूपणम्—५; समभिरूढनयनिरूपणम्—६; एवम्भूतनयनिरूपणम्—७;
अर्थशब्दनययोर्विवेकः, अपितानपितनयो व्यवहारनिश्चयनयो च—८; नयेषु
बहुविषयाल्पविषयत्वाभ्यां क्रमिकत्वम्—९; नयेष्वपि सप्तभङ्गीयोजना—१०;
नयाभासेष्वजैनमतानामन्तर्भावः—११,

३. निक्षेपपरिच्छेदः

पृ० २५—३०;

निक्षेपस्य लक्षणं भेदाश्च—१; नामनिक्षेपः—२; स्थापनानिक्षेपः—३;
द्रव्यनिक्षेपः—४; भावनिक्षेपः—५; चतुर्णां निक्षेपाणामभेदनिराकरणम्—६,
भावस्यावशिष्टानाञ्च नयानां परस्परमभेदो भेदश्च, निक्षेपाणां नयेषु योजनात्र
जिनभद्रगणीनां मतचर्चा च—८;

जीवविषये निक्षेपाः भावाभावविषये तत्त्वार्थटीकाकृतश्च मतम्—९; संसा-
रिजीवे द्रव्यत्वेऽपि भावत्वाविरोधः ।

प्रशस्तिश्लोकाः

पृ० ३० ।

4. TRANSLATION

On the Organ of Knowledge

pp. 33-70.

(The numerals indicate the para)

Salutations—The investigation into the definition of the
pramāṇa in general—1; refutation of the view-point that sense
qua attainment is the pramāṇa—2;

Definition of perceptual cognition—3; division of percep-
tual division into two : the empirical and the transcendental

—4; division of the empirical into two—sensuous and quasi-sensuous, further division of the two into two—sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge and the distinction between the sensuous cognition and scriptural knowledge—5;

Four divisions of sensuous cognition—6; refutation of the contactory nature of mind and sight while demonstrating the four types of contact-awareness in accordance with the number of the senses except eyes and mind—7;

Treatment of object-perception—8; refutation of the view point that it is not logically incoherent to say that 'he cognises the word' from the point of view of the fact that a child's cognition is that of general nature and for a man who is conversant with the object, the cognition is special—9; refutation of the view-point that the scriptural statement is not inconsistent because as object-perception is preceded by intuitional cognition, intuitional cognition cognises indistinct general features whereas the object perception cognises the form of the object as distinct from other objects—10; the classification of the perception into two; the transcendental and empirical and thereby justification for the varieties of quick and otherwise, etc.—11.

Investigation of speculation—12; perceptual judgement—13; retention and its three-fold classification—14; refutation of the view-point that in accordance with the etymological meaning, perceptual judgement is the determination of distinction from the non-existent particular and retention is determination of the existent particular—15;

Refutation of the view point that the two forms of knowledge, the absence of lapse and the memory, as cogniser of the already cognised, are not organ of knowledge and that no retention is compatible,—16; non-occurrence of the determinate perception etc. in a perverted or disturbed order or deficiently and three hundred and thirty six varieties of sensuous knowledge—17;

Fourteen varieties of verbal knowledge—18;

Definition of transcendental perception and its classification into three, as also the definition of clairvoyance and its classification into six—19;

Definition of telepathy and its classification into two—20; investigation into pure knowledge—21; refutation of the view-

point that pure knowledge is born of mind only purified by the qualities by spiritual practices—22; refutation of the Digambara view-point that a person who takes morsels of food, cannot have pure knowledge—23;

Definition of non-perceptual and its classification into five and refutation of the view-point that memory is non-organ of knowledge—24;

Investigation into recognition—25; refutation of Buddhist view-point that there is no such one knowledge as recognition—26; refutation of the view-point that recognition is produced by senses with the help of the memory, produced by the awakening of the latent impressions, born at the time of first sight at the time of the next sight—27;

Refutation of the *Mīmāṃsā* view-point that the knowledge of similarity is analogical and not recognition—28;

Refutation of the *Naiyāyika* view-point that analogy is the cognition of the relationship of word and its meaning—29;

Investigation into reasoning—30; in support of the reasoning as organ of knowledge by refuting the view-point that the concomitance may be said to be perceived by the sense helped by repeated sight and by non-observation of any exception—31; refutation of the Buddhist view point that reasoning is not an organ of knowledge as being in the form of an after-thought coming after the direct perception—32; refutation of the *Naiyāyika* view-point that reasoning is the reference to determinant concomitance when there is a doubt about determinate concomitant and it is not in itself an organ of knowledge—33;

Definition of inference and its classification into two—34; while defining cause, refutation of the *Buddhist* view-point that the cause has three characteristics—35; elaboration of the theory that subsistence in the subject is not a part of the inference—36; the incoherence of differentiating between internal concomitance and external concomitance merely on account of the difference in its subject, because concomitance is universal and refutation of the *Naiyāyika* view-point that cause has five characteristics—37;

The discussion of the nature of probandum—38; refutation of the view-point that only a doubtful thing can be established as a probandum in a debate—39; the epithet of 'not refuted' is given in connection with both the speaker and the opponent whereas the epithet of 'being desirable' is said only with reference to the speaker—40; from the point of view of grasping the concomitance, the quality itself is the probandum whereas from the point of view of inference, the well-known subject, together with its quality to be proved, is the probandum—41; the qualified object is known as proved, optionally and both ways—42; refutation of the *Buddhistic* view-point that existence cannot be probandum in the qualified subject which is optional—43; refutation of the *Naiyāyika* view-point that there is no qualified object which is optionally proved—44; the qualified object which is proved optionally is not experienced in toto—45; propriety of proving the existence or non-existence, in part, of the well known object—46;

While discussing the inference-for-others, refutation of the *Buddhistic* view that the subject should not be expressively said—47; refutation of the view point that the inference-for-others is only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing—48; the two ways of using the cause—as concomitant with the probandum and as being one-impossible-without-the-other—49; only two—the statement of the thesis and the cause—are the parts of inference for others—50; for a person of dull wit, the use of illustration, application and conclusion and the use of purification of the thesis etc. should also be made, and thus the cause can have even ten parts—51;

The varieties of cause, six types of that positive cause which proves something positive—52; seven types of that positive cause which proves something negative—53; five types of that negative cause which proves something positive—54; seven types of that negative cause which proves something negative—55;

Three varieties of fallacy—56; establishing the fallacy unproved for either—57; definition of contradictory cause—58; definition of inconclusive—59; non-acceptability of the fallacy 'immaterial' accepted by *Dharmabhūṣana*—60; investigation of

the definition of the organ of knowledge, viz., scriptures—61; seven-fold way of statement in the scriptures—62; the nature of seven-fold statement—63; the full and the partial seven-fold statement—64; identification and difference with reference to time etc.—65.

2. *On the partial point of view* pp. 71-77.

Treatment of the nature of the partial point of view, its classification into two : of the modes and of the substance; the inclusion of analytic stand-point in the substantial according to *Jinabhadragaṇi*—1; the non-distinguished stand-point-2; the generic stand-point-3; the analytic stand-point-4; the verbal stand-point-5; the subtle stand-point-6; the such-like stand-point—7; difference between points of view of meaning and words, implied view-point and unimplied view-point, real view-point and empirical view-point, the view-points of knowledge and action-8; the gradual degree of points of view which covers much and less—9; the application of seven-fold statement with reference to points of view also-10; the inclusion of non-Jaina schools in the false points of view while discussing their nature-11.

3. *On the symbol* pp. 77-84.

The definition of symbol and its varieties—1; the symbol of name-2; the symbol of replacement-3; the symbol of substance-4; the actual symbol-5; the refutation of the concept of non-difference of the four symbols-6; the non-difference and difference between actual symbol and other symbols-7; adjustment of the symbols in the points of view and the opinion of *Jinabhadragaṇi* in this context-8; the symbols with reference to soul and the opinion of the commentator of the *Tattvārtha (Tattvārthabhāṣyavṛtti)* 9; the coherence of actual symbol with reference to mundane soul which are substantial-10.

4. EULOGY	85
5. NOTES	89-145
6. INDEX OF THE SANSKRIT WORDS	146-162
7. INDEX OF THE WORKS QUOTED	163-164
8. INDEX OF THE NOTES	165-167
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY.	168-173

INTRODUCTION

About five years ago, I wrote in the preface of my work, *Jaina Ethics* : “the metaphysical Reality or Truth of logical coherence must remain merely a theoretical possibility unless it is translated into good of life through right living. In fact, the reality or truth is supra-logical and can be better realized by living it practically than by speculating on it intellectually.”

Little did I know that I myself may have to write one day on the ‘truth of logical coherence’ from the Jaina point of view. I had an occasion to guide a *Jaina* nun in the intricacies of the *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* of *Ācārya Yasovijaya*. I was attracted by the maturity and depth of the work. Therefore, when Dr. R. C. Pandey, Professor and Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi, Delhi, suggested that I should take up the translation of this work and when *M/S Moti Lal Banarasidass* offered to publish my translation with annotations, I gladly took up the work.

This effort of mine is humble in more than one way. In the first place, I have had no opportunity to study the subject of *Jaina* logic at the feet of a qualified *Guru* and as Pt. *Sukha Lala Ji* in his introduction to *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* has observed,¹ “it is not possible to follow a work like *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* without having a certain back-ground of the subject” and as Dr. *Satakari Mookerjee* has made the same observation regarding the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā*,² my attempt to write a commentary on the *Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā* is indeed a courageous step. My only help, however, in this task have been the works of my predecessors. Though all such works have been noted in the bibliography, special mention, however, may be made of the works of Pt. *Sukhalalji* whom I have followed in my *text* and whose notes on the *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* have been my guide throughout

1. PP. 8-9.

2. Mookerjee, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, preface, p. XI.

the work. In fact for the depth with which *Pt. Sukhalal Ji* has approached the problem of *Jaina logic*, it is very difficult for anybody to write anything on *Jaina logic* without being largely influenced by his works. No better compliments to *Pt. Sukhalal Ji* can be paid than that of *Dr. Satakari Mookerjee* : '*Pt. Sukhalal Ji* is the most learned man in the *Jaina* community and one of the foremost scholars of India. His knowledge of the *Buddhist*, *Jaina* and *Nyāya* systems is astounding and this has enabled him to edit the master pieces of *Jaina Philosophy* with perfect mastery and accuracy. The world will remain indebted to him for his contributions. He is one of the few intellectual stalwarts in the traditional field of Sanskrit scholarship that still are left to us'.¹

The development of the art of logic is rather a late phenomenon. This art of logic in India is invariably connected with religion and spiritualism. Still it has been claimed that it is a separate branch of learning.² The fact the science of logic is claimed to be a source of equanimity in misery and pleasure³ brings in very near to spiritualism,⁴ though this fact has perhaps escaped the notice of the classical authors. The ancient people, however, were conscious of the desirability⁵ as well as non-desirability⁶ of logic. This contradiction can be solved by understanding that the Reality is supra-logical but not illogical. The orthodox authors have perhaps not mentioned clearly this point also. The logic can take us to a certain point and is, therefore, useful, but because it cannot take us beyond a certain point, it becomes useless and it also becomes harmful when we insist that it should lead us to the Ultimate Reality. It may be said in other words that from spiritual point of view the utility of logic consists in showing the futility of logic for realisation of the Ultimate.

1. Mookerjee, *Pramāṇanimānsā*, preface. p. XIV.

2. Cf *Nyāyabhāṣya*. 1.1.1.

3. *Arthaśāstra*, 1.2 व्यसनेऽभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति Also *Nītivākya-mṛta*, 5.56. व्यसनेषु न विधीदति नाभ्युदयेन विकार्यते ।

4. *Gītā*, 2.38.

5. *Rāmāyaṇa* (Ayodhyā kāṇḍa), 100.39; and *Mahābhārata* (*Śāntiparva*), 180.47.49. and *Manusmṛti* 11.106.

6. *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, 1.3 and *Arthaśāstra*, chapter 2.

Whatever the position, it is a fact that there has been a tussle between the two view-points—the pro-logic and the anti-logic. The Jainas, true to their philosophy of neutrality, kept themselves aloof from all tussles in the beginning, but ultimately they had also to develop a science of logic of their own. This became necessary to defend oneself from the attacks of the opponents, who had begun challenging the rationality of the Jaina viewpoint. Not only this but it might have been also felt that a creed needs to be presented in an appealing form so that it could become popular. All scholars of philosophy, therefore, devoted themselves to the science of logic.

As far as the Jainas are concerned, they could find the basis for their system of logic in their scriptures themselves. It is but natural, because any thinking is, after all, based on some logic; that it may not have been systematised, is a different question. The *Jaina* logicians rightly caught the spirit of *Jaina* scriptures when they said that the main theme of the Jainism is non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) and that every statement is to be accepted only relatively true (*syādvāda*).

Pandit *Dalsukhbhai Malavaniya* has shown how we can find the germs of non-absolutism in the *Jaina* scriptures¹ and we need not repeat it here. Similarly, he has also dealt with the seven-fold statement, as found in the *Jaina* scriptures². The theory of the partial point of view (*Text*, chapter II) has also its origin in the *Jaina* scriptures.³

The other topics discussed in our *text* are also mostly dealt with in the *Jaina* scriptures. The five types of knowledge (*Text*, pp. 2-8) are mentioned by the *Bhagavatīśūtra*⁴ and the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*,⁵ in addition to the *Nandīśūtra* which discusses only the varieties of knowledge in detail. Our author, *Yaśovijaya*, has mainly followed *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* in this context. As regards other topics, *Anuyogadvāra*⁶ mentions four types of

1. Āgamayuga kā Jaina Darśana, Agra, 1966, pp 51-91.
2. Ibid, pp. 92-115.
3. Ibid, pp. 114-124.
4. 88.2.317.
5. Sūtra, 77.
6. Sūtra, 59.

organ of knowledge (*Text*. 1.3 and 1-24). The three types of the inference, mentioned in the *Jaina* scriptures¹ are replaced by two varieties of our text (1.34). The same is the case with Hindu logic also where the *Nyāyasūtra* gives the same three varieties² as given in the *Jaina* scriptures and the later books like *Tarkasaṅgraha* mention the same two varieties as given in our *Text*. The *Jaina* scriptures also mention five types of causes³ (Cf text 1.52 and 1.54). The other tradition mentioned in the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*⁴ is nearer to the description of our *text*. Our text (1.50) has accepted only two parts of syllogism whereas *Bhadrabāhu* in his *Daśavaikālikaniryukti*⁵ has given a syllogism consisting of ten parts. The art of debate, which occupied an important place not only in the *Jaina* scriptures⁶ but in the ancient Hindu logic also⁷, was later on neglected in both the traditions. We, therefore, refrain from giving the details about this aspect.

The above account is based on the *Jaina āgamas* which assume their present form in 533 A.D. (according to the followers of *Śkaṇḍila*) or 466 A.D. (according to the followers of *Nagārjuna*).⁸ There are some authors, who are placed earlier than this period, and who have contributed to the development of *Jaina* logic. The first of such authors is *Kundakundācārya* who is generally placed in the middle of the 3rd century A.D.⁹

Ācārya Kundakunda justified¹⁰ the special meaning attributed to the term 'direct perception' by the *Jaina* logicians. (*Text*—1.3 and 1.4) As regards the concept of omniscience (*Text* 1.21) he made the remarkable statement that from real point of view the omniscient knows only the self.¹¹ As regards the seven-fold statement, *Kundakundācārya* agrees with

1. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 148.
2. *Nyāyasūtra*. 1.1.5.
3. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, p. 151-152.
4. See *Ibid*, p. 159.
5. *Gāthā*, 92 ff and also *Gāthā*, 137.
6. *Āgama Yuga Kā Jaina Darśana*, Chapter IV.
7. Cf. *Nayasūtra*, 1.1.1.
8. *Bhārgava*, D., *Jaina Ethics*, p. 228. For detail see pp. 223-228.
9. *Ibid*, p. 247.
10. *Pravacanasāra*, 1.57, 58.
11. *Niyamasāra*, 158.

out *text* (1.63) in placing the inexplicable mode of saying at the fourth place¹ but in the *Pravacanasāra*² he himself places it in the third place.

Next comes *Umāsvāmi* (known as *Umāsvāti* in the *Śvetāmbara* tradition) who is placed in the third century A.D.³ He mentions along with the organs of knowledge the partial view point also.⁴ He, however, mentions only five view points⁵ in place of seven in our text (2.1). This is, of course according to the *Śvetāmbara* reading. The *Digambara* reading is different and gives all the seven view points. *Umāsvāti*, in his auto-commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, explains that the partial view points do not represent any Jaina subjects or non-Jaina schools but are only the different aspects of looking at an object.⁶ After *Umāsvāti* come *Ācārya Siddhasena* and *Sāmantabhadra*, both of whom could be placed near about fourth century A. D. Here we need not go into the controversy as to who of them preceded. It appears that this controversy has assumed a sectarian colour, as all the *Śvetāmbara* scholars insist on the precedence of *Siddhasena* whereas the *Digambara* scholars insist on the precedence of *Samantabhadra*. The question is considered to be important because one, who preceded of the two, would be given the credit of laying the foundation of Jaina logic. We, however, do not enter this controversy.

The definition of the organ of knowledge in our *Text* (1. 1) was given by *Siddhasena*.⁷ He also gave the definition of cause⁸ which is substantially the same as given in our *Text*. (1. 35). He also made distinction between internal concomitance and external concomitance (*Text*; 1. 37). The distinction of the empirical and the transcendental perceptual cognition (*Text*, 1.4) was also made by him for the first time. Besides,

1. *Pañcāstikāya*, 14.
2. 2.23.
3. *Bhargava*, D., *Jaina Ethics*, p. 251.
4. *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.6.
5. *Ibid*, 1.34. नैगमसङ्ग्रहव्यवहारजुसूत्रशब्दनयाः ।
6. Auto-commentary, *Ibid.*, 1.35.
7. *Nyāyāvātāra*, I
8. *Ibid*, 22.
9. *Ibid*, 20.